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ABSTRACT

Paradoxes of Feminist Stances in “New Turkey”:
Reconceiving NGO-State Relationships in the Case of KAMER

by
Irem Kilic

Advisor: Dagmar Herzog

This thesis explores the multifaceted nature of positionality of feminist NGOs and their collaborative
relationship with the state, focusing particularly on the case of KAMER, a women’s rights NGO in
Turkey. By analyzing the interviews and the fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2018, this study
finds that the domain of KAMER’s work, the region in which it operates and the urgency of the
needs it caters to necessitates collaboration not only with the state but also with its repressive
apparatuses, though the organization can instrumentalize these to further their feminist mission. In
order to demonstrate this, the following thesis analyzes the gender politics of the current government
and, in Foucauldian terms, its technologies and the ways in which they have been deployed; and
finally exposes the relationship between KAMER and the state, elucidating the exceptionality of
KAMER as a feminist NGO operating in an AKP-dominated political and social landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have globally expanded
and become one of the key types of organizations in national and global political scenes alike. Despite
the ubiquity, heterogeneity, and proliferation of these organizations, they have been perceived as a
unified phenomenon. In the literature on NGOs, scholars have tackled them in various ways and
perspectives: for some scholars, NGOs are civil society organizations that have emerged as opposed
to the state, while others see NGOs as actors that allow local grassroots organizations to vocalize
their concerns, or as vehicles that reinforce and elevate modernization, as a ‘third sector’ with
economic functions, or even as amplifiers of neoliberalism or imperialism (Fisher, 2003; Schuller,
2009; Bora and Caglar, 2002, Funk, 2006; Hearn; 2007). Others have argued that nongovernmental
organizations and their work activities are mapped out and constructed by governments, contending
that NGOs are in intertwined relationships with the government, with deep affinities, and tied to their
funding resources (Elyachar, 2002).

Many researchers have pointed out that “by the end of the twentieth century, feminist
activism had shifted [away] from participation in political movements towards advocacy and action
in feminist and women's NGOs” (Lang 1997; Alvarez, 1999; Bernal, 2000; Halley, 2006). The voices
of the feminist struggle and its demands, which have been absent and excluded from bargaining on
an official level, have resonated stronger and become louder as women’s rights NGOs increasingly
take place on international platforms such as the UN Committee on the Status of Women (CSW), or
the World Conference on Women in Beijing. However, feminist NGOs’ engagement with such
transnational organizations or with “foreign intervention agencies”, as Jansen defines them, and the
tied nature of their financial relationship with their resources have both been extensively criticized
1

and referred to as a ‘bureaucratization’ and ‘NGOization’ of feminism (2006:24).
In the summer of 2018, during my research in Turkey, I initially intended to reflect on this
question in the Turkish context: to focus on women’s rights NGOs and their relationship with their
resources — UN and EU funds — and questioned whether these relationships were disciplinary or
emancipatory for the organizations. I asked questions to better understand their perception, thoughts,
insights, experiences, and criticisms —if there were any— regarding their connection with sponsor
institutions, with other feminist NGOs as well as with the government. As I conducted these semistructured interviews, I gave a special importance to the participants’ autonomy to express
themselves and their perspectives with the aim of minimizing self-censorship. And with the help of
this structure and thanks to the reference that I received from one of the founders of a well-known
and trusted feminist NGO, I was able to interview various actors in Turkish NGOs, who talked about
various topics, which included their thoughts about other organizations as well. By that time, I
frequently heard criticism towards one of the oldest feminist organizations in Turkey, KAMER,
which often targeted the organization’s relationship and collaboration with the current government,
the Justice and Development (AKP) and its hierarchical structure.
Following my interviews in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya, I traveled to Diyarbakir and
Mardin to visit KAMER and learn more about its work. During this time, I had a chance to spend
time and engage with almost every individual who worked at the organization and participated in its
fieldwork — “house(hold) visits and neighborhood meetings”1— I also visited its Avlu Cafe, the

1

The “household visits” are practiced everyday by a group of women from KAMER. The group go to houses in each

neighborhood of the city, where the office is located. First, they introduce themselves and explain the reason for their
visits to the women and girls of each household. If the women show consent to talk with the group, they mostly host
them at their places and the group ‘chat’ with them causally based on their questionnaire, which will be explained further
in the following chapters. The “neighborhood meetings” are gatherings that take place on the public spaces such as center
of the villages and usually a group of people, who are respected in the region such as imams, teachers, doctors talk about
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sewing center, and production atelier that exclusively employs women who need support from
KAMER, and finally the Health Center in Mardin. I soon came to realize that KAMER and its
activities, its feminism and connection with women, methods, and the design of its field of activities
stood out from the other women’s rights NGOs in the Western part of the country. During this time,
I found that KAMER did collaborate with the government that had adopted conservative gender
politics, which targeted and marginalized feminist groups, instead of “turning its back” and “severing
all ties” with it. However, the close engagement and involvement with KAMER allowed me to see
the complex and multifaceted nature of this relationship and positionality. As did other feminist
NGOs that focused on women’s empowerment, KAMER, too, preserved its feminist stance within
this collaboration and its relationship with the state by instrumentalizing the state and its (repressive)
apparatus to maintain and further services for women. Despite the multidimensional and complex
nature of positionality even from the same inclinations and standpoints, which oppose AKP politics,
these differences have been flattened or collapsed with the presumption that women’s rights
organizations are homogeneous, consistent, and harmonious in the adversarial political landscape of
NGOs. In other words, although KAMER shares feminist critical politics with others, other feminist
organizations place KAMER within a typology of pro-government women’s rights NGOs, because
of KAMER’s utilization of the state’s resources.
As will be illustrated, the nature of KAMER’s work, the region in which it operates and the
urgency of the needs it caters to necessitates that collaboration with the government. In fact, this
thesis will argue that KAMER instrumentalizes the government and its institutions to further its
feminist mission. To demonstrate this, in Chapter 1 the fieldwork will be explained in further detail,
as will the history of the establishment of KAMER, the domains of its work, and its methodologies.

issues such as underage marriages.
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Chapter 2 will analyze the gender politics of the AKP, and, in Foucauldian terms, its technologies
and the ways in which they are deployed. Finally, in Chapter 3, I will provide an exposition of the
relationship between KAMER and the state, and thereby hope to elucidate the exceptionality of
KAMER as a feminist NGO operating in an AKP-dominated political and social landscape.
BACKGROUND
Research
In the summer of 2018, particularly from July to August, as part of my research for my thesis
project in the Women & Gender Studies Program at the Graduate Center (CUNY), I conducted
interviews with over 10 women's rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Turkey,
and with three Turkish branches of international human rights organizations. The aim of this study
was to explore how women’s rights-focused and feminist NGOs work, and to document the work
they do, to shed light on different feminist methods of intervention and field-specific negotiations
with institutions of power, which often complicates implied narratives of alignment or opposition.
However, during the conversations with my interviewees I picked up on criticism towards each other,
particularly towards the Women’s Center (KAMER) due to its relationship and collaboration with
the government’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), who are perceived as being conservative in
gender politics and exerting pressure on feminist groups and organizations, which lead me to revise
the focus of my research, in order to narrow in on KAMER’s relationship with the institutions of the
state.
My interviews took place in various cities of Turkey (see Figure 1): Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya,
Diyarbakir, Mardin, and Kiziltepe. Depending on the interviewees’ availability and requests, I met
with my interviewees mostly in their offices, but also sometimes at cafes and hotel lobbies.

4

Figure 1: Interview locations (source: Google, 2019)

Prior to conducting formal interviews, I met with individuals from various NGOs whom I
had contacted via email with an introduction of myself and a brief explanation of my research. During
the formal interviews, I chose to not record our conversations to avoid any possible self-censorship
due to the political conjuncture that has put pressure on feminist organizations, which will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Instead, I took notes and when needed, I asked follow-up questions
to clarify their responses and confirm the accuracy of my notes. The interview duration varied from
2 hours to 4 hours depending on the participant’s responses.

Interviewees
The interviewees consisted of 16 women and 4 men aged 22 to 65, who had various
occupations; lawyers, doctors, academics, activists, educators, graduate students, and psychologists.
Most of them were key individuals such as founders of feminist NGOs that work for women and
girls’ empowerment in Turkey, and women who were born and raised in Turkey.
During my time in Turkey from mid-July to early September of 2018, I aimed to meet as
many women’s rights NGOs as possible, regardless of interviewees’ positions in the organizations
5

and of the ideologies of the NGOs, to grasp their perspectives, methods, fields of activities, as well
as to understand their relationships with the government. Additionally, I was interested in
documenting both the commonalities and differences in positions adopted by Turkish NGOs in
different parts of the country, particularly focusing on their (sometimes non-)collaboration with the
state. The beginning of my research in early July of 2018 coincided with the victory of the
conservative party, AKP, in the Turkish parliamentary election, which proved difficult to initiate a
meeting with Turkish NGOs since it aroused suspicion and reluctance to meet an “unknown”
researcher with “unknown” intentions. It was only after I obtained a reference from respected
feminist women who had conducted work in women’s rights NGOs and hence had connections with
the leaders of other NGOs that I could initiate my research.
I conducted a semi-structured interview method and asked pre-determined questions that did
not have a specific order, which was helpful, as the participant’s responses varied. I used open-ended
questions about the relationships they had with their sponsors and how they positioned themselves
among other feminist NGOs, and asked about the impact of the AKP’s increasing conservative tone
and gender politics, the ways in which they conduct their researches, how they remained
independent, and their methods and approaches to their work, with the purpose of understanding the
intricate relationships of feminist NGOs with power.
In this chapter, the history of KAMER will be divided into three periods; in the first phase,
the establishment of KAMER, focusing on its founder’s, Nebahat Akkoc, personal life and
experiences as a woman in the late 1990s in Turkey will be discussed. In the second phase, the early
years of KAMER, its struggle to survive as an independent organization in defiance of the pressure
of political conjecture, and the collaboration and interaction it created with other women’s rights
organizations will be illustrated. And in the last part, KAMER as an independent organization and
its transformed relationship with the government and other women’s rights organizations will be
6

analyzed. To present today’s KAMER’s accurately, its field of activities and methods will be
explained in detail. Throughout the chapters, my interviewees’ statements appear as quotes or as
paraphrases. However, I have chosen not to use my interviewee’s names, rather referring to them as
“interviewee” to protect their privacy. Moreover, the individuals I quote describe their own
experiences only, and at no point am I drawing broader conclusions or in any way generalizing from
the findings.
1.1. Establishment of KAMER: Blackmail, Arrests, Police Busts, and Torture
The Women’s Center (KAMER) was officially founded by Nebahat Akkoc2 in 1997 in
Diyarbakir as a “consultation, handicraft development, and marketing company,” not as a foundation,
for lack of the financial resources that were necessary for a legal status, nor as an association
“because [it] had to meet with the requirements of the Law of Associations and had to have a board
of directors” (Akkoc, 2007: 208). The idea of doing ‘women’s work’ has its roots in the experiences
Akkoc had during the Turkish military coup d'état in the 1980s when her husband Zubeyir Akkoc
was arrested and became a political prisoner in Diyarbakir, a place also known as "the hell of
Diyarbakır" due to reports of systematic torture and inmate deaths during custody.3 In the early

2

Akkoc was born in Bingol in 1955. She received primary education in Hazro and Silvan districts of Diyarbakır. After

primary school, she went to “Mardin Girls Teaching Elementary School” as a boarder. As part of the East-West
Amalgamation move in 1970, she had to finish her teaching education in “Manisa Mardin Girls Teaching Elementary
School”. She completed an associate degree program in Eskisehir Anatolia University while teaching. She taught several
schools in villages, districts and city centrum of Diyarbakır for 22 years. She became an activist in TÖB-DER (Teachers
Association Foundation of Turkey), an organization that was active until 1980. She was the chairperson of Diyarbakır
branch of EĞİTİM-SEN (Education and Science Workers’ Union) between 1990-1993. Afterward, she became a member
of the General Executive Board of the Human Rights Association (İHD). She functioned as the Regional Representative
during her service. In 1994, she joined Democratic People’s Party (DEP) as a substitute member for four months (SU
Gender).
3

Chapter in Rights, Citizenship & Torture: Perspectives on Evil, Law and the State, Welat Zeydanlıoğlu and John T.

Parry (eds.), Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2009, pp.73-92. “Torture and Turkification in the Diyarbakır Military
Prison” accessed on 24.04.2019 https://kyleorton1991.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/welat-zeydanlioglu-2009-tortureand-turkification-in-the-diyarbakir-military-prison-from-rights-citizenship-and-torture.pdf.
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1980s, when Akkoc started to visit her husband at the prison, she, too, was subjected to violence at
the checkpoints, as were other female visitors; mothers, daughters, sisters, and wives of other
prisoners. In addition to living these experiences, she was helping illiterate women, such as
those who had come from different cities but could not see their relatives in Diyarbakir, and Akkoc
learned about their stories and developed strong bonds of friendships.
In the following years, when Akkoc’s husband was murdered by unknown assailants in
Diyarbakir, she was exposed to torture by the state’s forces during one of her custodies in Diyarbakir
Prison.4 During this period of her life, she started realizing the prevalence of systemic violence
against women and how they had to endure it consistently throughout their lifetimes. Akkoc
describes this time of custody in the late 1990s as the time that “changed her chemistry” and as “a
milestone for her to dedicate her career to women’s human rights work” (Belge, 2012:49).
Prior to the official establishment of KAMER in 1997, Akkoc bought her first computer,
turned one of the rooms in her apartment into an office and started “piling up all the books about
feminism and working non-stop” starting in February 1994. She initiated the “Women’s Peace
Movement” with the Human Rights Association (IHD), an organization based in Diyarbakir, where
she was a member of its Executive Committee. But this project ended with frustration and
disappointment because of the association's unwillingness to be transparent about its findings, which
she believed would unveil the gravity of state violence against women. Thereafter, it became clearer
for Akkoc that she should prioritize doing women’s work independently and not under the direction
of another organization, association, or political party. “After all, which organizations or groups are

4

Akkoc was one of the first few people who applied individually to the European Court of Human Rights (AIHM) in

Turkey in 1992. First, she applied with the concern of her life safety, later her husband’s unsolved murder, and last the
torture she subjected to under the custody due to her position as chairperson of Diyarbakir branch of EĞİTİM-SEN
(Education and Science Workers’ Union) between 1990-1993. After her case, she gained order of protection from OSCE
(The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). In her interview with Belge, she says AIHM played an
important in the democratization of Turkey.
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free from the patriarchy?” (Belge, 2012:108).
On the one hand, Akkoc was well aware of the gendered nature of violence and of women’s
pain and thus believed that its work should be independent: she was not planning to take a side in a
fight that would impose a particular allegiance on her or her organization. On the other hand, she
was aware that “those [who were] positioned or seemed different” faced custody, imprisonment or
displacement and isolation. “Being independent was the most difficult thing to do at that time. No
one wanted, neither could dare to be independent due to the [current] state of affairs, and I was left
alone so many times” (Belge, 2012:147).
In 1994, KAMER informally went into action by conducting its first research project on
domestic violence against women. Seeing strong demand from the region of Eastern Anatolia and
alarmed by the violence women were subjected to, it intensified its work. In particular, KAMER
focused on the domestic sphere as a domain where violence is normalized and a part of daily life.
Following the principle of working “for women, with women,” it started conducting house visits in
1994, which then became a core aspect of its methodology. KAMER was officially launched in 1997.
Although domestic violence was one of the first subjects that the Turkish feminist movements
acknowledged in the 1980s, the amount and quality of work was inadequate in problematizing this
subject and tackling it, due to the state of affairs and the resources at that time. This feminist project
was carried independently from any organization or political party and aimed to reach out to various
sources of knowledge on women’s human rights, thus enabling it to share its findings with the whole
country.
In addition to a desire to maintain KAMER’s independence and given that violence does not
discriminate women based on their socio-economic backgrounds, it was crucial for Akkoc to adopt
her own non-discriminative approaches. Especially in a period where society was extremely
polarized due to the coups d'etats in the 1980s, Akkoc envisioned inclusivity and ‘not leaving anyone
9

behind’ because of their identity or religious beliefs. Thus, for all women, whether they were Kurdish
or Turkish, Alevis or Sunni, KAMER intended to provide a common ground where they could meet
under the premise of ‘womanhood:’

“Despite the fact that the majority of women we were planning to support and work with
identified themselves as Kurdish, we did not want to be the ‘Kurdish Women’s Center.’ We
did not want to be confined within one single identity. We believed in the preciousness and
value of every single woman’s life, we wanted to be the center for women who did not
identify as Kurdish, too” (Akkoc, 2007).
Today, KAMER defines its core principles as:
“• To be on the side of human rights and ‘women’s human rights’
• To be independent of all political organizations, NGOs, individuals, agencies, and
institutes
• To reject all forms of discrimination
• To reject all forms of violence
• To reject structural hierarchy without trivializing knowledge and experience
• To support, share, and build solidarity
• To think globally while working locally” (kamer.org.tr/about-us).

KAMER and its formation emerged from the social and political events in the region, Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia in particular, and from the individual experiences of women, but it in turn
contributed greatly to advancing Turkish second wave feminism with its work in light of these
foundational principles (Arat, 2007).

10

1.2. Early Years of KAMER: From Threats to Intimidation to Finally Collaboration

A few years after the official establishment of KAMER in 1997, it was under intense pressure
from both the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)— “a militant organization that has been in armed
conflict with the Turkish state since 1984 to achieve independent Kurdish state”5—and the
government, as both persisted that KAMER should endorse its platforms: there were threats, which
later evolved into intimidation. In my interview with Akkoc in Istanbul in the summer of 2018, she
mentioned the difficulties she had when the organization was founded 22 years prior in Diyarbakir,
due to the pressure they were experiencing from the PKK and the government, as both were asking
them to take a side and to collaborate. Although that pressure "caused KAMER great distress," it
resisted, particularly for the first three years, and remained independent (Akkoc, 2018 interview).
Many events lead by KAMER were canceled by the State of Emergency Governorship of
Diyarbakir, which was established in 1980, and women that worked at the foundation were isolated.
The government created its own women’s organizations that “made so many groundless claims about
KAMER.” Finally, in the early 2000s, the period of intimidation started to evolve into collaboration
with the government, and in 2003, KAMER was supported by a governmental institution and the
governor for the first time (Belge, 2012:164).

Interactions with other feminists: collaborations & disagreements
As the women at KAMER were challenging sexism and endeavoring to distance themselves
from all kind of partisanship, individual awareness on the issues they tackled started to surface.
Women began to question their own experiences of violence, discrimination, oppression and their
own —unintentional— oppression of other women. Akkoc describes this stage as the “realization of

5

“Kurdistan Workers' Party” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party accessed 01. 04.2019
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systemic sexism and taking the first step towards feminism,” where women suffered deeply and were
left “vagrant.” In this transition period between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the only place those
women could get support from were other women and particularly women’s organizations such as
KAMER (Belge, 2012).

KAMER received the support of some feminist organizations from within and outside the
regions of Istanbul and Ankara, in spite of hesitation towards then-unknown reputation of the
organization, the political environment, and Akkoc’s history of detention and cases against her.
The Purple Roof, one of the women’s organizations based in Ankara, collaborated with KAMER
since it mostly focused on the problem of violence against women. Thus, it shared its experiences
and knowledge on how to work on the subject of violence. With its support, KAMER created
“awareness-raising” workshops, which collaborated with other feminist organizations such as
Ankara Women’s Solidarity Foundation.

Due to the lack of presence of psychologists in Diyarbakir, the psychologists Julide Aral,
Ufuk Sezgin, and Sahika Yuksel from CAPA Medical School of Istanbul University trained women
in KAMER; as did Insa Wessendorf from Germany. These women helped KAMER make
connections with women’s shelters in Germany and translated many publications on methods of
fighting violence against women into Turkish. Furthermore, the British diplomat Karen Fogg, then
Head of the European Commission Delegation in Ankara and the delegation of the European Union
to Turkey, partnered with KAMER in 1997 and in a press conference held in the following years
Frogg highlighted the independence of KAMER as a women’s organization by stating that the
Commission will continue to support them.

12

1.3. Today’s KAMER: “Being in Good Terms with the Government”
In 2003, KAMER was recognized for the first time as an official institution by the
government, made evident when the governorship of the State of Emergency in Diyarbakir and the
governor Gokhan Aydiner supported KAMER by sponsoring its projects on women’s
entrepreneurship and by personally joining the opening of studios that were used by women from the
organization. In the following years, KAMER started to collaborate more with the state, while being
particularly cautious to avoid any possible harm to the organization’s independence, meanwhile
avoiding to take definitive positions that would close the door to any future collaborations due to the
nature of its work depending on such collaborations.

Fields of Activities and Methods
‘Non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) and ‘women’s rights NGOs’ diverge from a
particular definition of problems and problematization of chosen domains: based on detected needs,
it identifies its tools. Maxine Molyneux divides women’s interests into “practical” and “strategic”
ones, and according to this distinction, women’s practical interests manifest themselves in daily life
as positioned within the gendered division of labor, where women’s basic needs are usually a
response to an immediate perceived need such as food security and childcare. Strategic interests are,
on the other hand, manifested to challenge patriarchy and underlie the structural inequalities such as
the abolition of the sexual division of labor, the burden of domestic work, and childcare (2002: 233).
The link between these two interests are ones, which can only emerge through “dialogue, praxis, and
discussion” (Rai, 2007: 25). Such interests form and embody an existence that can be seen, discussed,
and struggled for. As KAMER does not exclude one interest from another and tackles them as a
whole, its methods and approaches in its field of activities synthesize the dialogue, praxis, and
discussion harmoniously, which will be shown in detail in the following chapters.
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The mission of KAMER is summarized as “identifying the sexist cultures and traditions that
harm women and children and developing alternative methods and approaches, ensuring the
feasibility of implementation of these methods.” The feminism of KAMER aligns with human rights
values, the fight against any forms of discrimination, violence, and structural hierarchy while
focusing on solidarity, and “thinking globally while working locally” (“Our Goals,” KAMER
Website, 2019). Therefore, KAMER believes “concepts of feminism and the lived experience are
determined at the individual level” use it as its slogan. With this slogan, it stands with the universality
of feminist principles, meanwhile criticizing the culture of the regions women were born in, using
the universal umbrella term ‘womanhood’ as a principle that goes beyond language, culture, religion,
and locality, enhancing the variety of feminism(s). This perspective puts KAMER in a unique
position in the Turkish NGO tradition in the country.
While KAMER centralizes its focus on the problem of domestic violence, ‘honor’ killings,
and forced and underage marriages by providing training on women’s human rights and raising
awareness, it also conducts research on issues such as early childhood education and women’s
entrepreneurship that combines both its local and universal understanding of feminism. KAMER, as
a problem-driven organization, does not constrain its field of activities to the problem of violence.
The work of KAMER can be categorized into four groups:

1.3.1. Awareness Practices for Women’s Human Rights

“KAMER has planned all its activities and projects based on women’s own demands and needs.”
(Interviewee, KAMER)
‘Awareness Practices’ are “the practices that are conducted through various methods to ensure
women and men realize, question, and develop methods and resistance to their persistent status
14

within the framework of traditional rules. The ‘Awareness Practices’ date back to 1996, when
KAMER was not officially established yet. In these workshops, KAMER formed groups with 40-50
people with backgrounds in psychology and law and collaborated with other more experienced
women's rights NGOs.
First, these workshops started as “consciousness-raising” primarily aiming at women’s
realization of violence in their life, and these workshops were later renamed “awareness practices.”
As Akkoc explains, “this name ‘consciousness-raising’ was creating a hierarchy by implying that
certain groups have already had their ‘consciousness’ raised, which could lead to them attempting to
raise others’ consciousness. However, [KAMER] thinks that we raise our consciousness on gender
inequality with all of our experiences. We also have a book that we use as a guidebook. In the
introduction, we call this ‘multiplying through raising awareness” (Belge, 2012: 153).
Some of KAMER’s work and reports are turned into booklets with titles such as We Will Not
Get Used to It (2003), No More ‘If Only’s (2004), Who’s to Blame? (2005), We Can Stop This (2006)
— these were sent to different ministers and members of the government. The report Akkoc mentions
in the quote from Multiply through Raising Awareness was first published in 2007 on the 10th
anniversary of KAMER. Subsequently, the report was “evaluated, criticized and suggestions were
made by many women’s organization,” and the second edition was published in 2012 (Akkoc, 2012:
105). In this booklet, Akkoc explains KAMER’s methods for standing up against violence in detail
by describing its methodology: how these centers work, what environment it aims to create in the
interview rooms, the language that staff uses. Two chapters are dedicated to the stories of — and
feedback from — women who had received support, and the observations from women who worked
at these centers. Here, KAMER defines itself with a story told by a woman who had visited the
organization:
“Hodja starts to fall down from a chimney. One of the onlookers starts screaming:
‘Hodja is falling down, call the doctor!’ he says.
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Hodja hears the comment and starts yelling back:
‘Not a doctor, call someone who has also fallen down a chimney before!’”
However, unlike Hodja, for those women who have experienced violence, there was no one
seeing them falling, nor anyone offering help or the ability to call a doctor. In fact, there was no
doctor to be called. And according to Akkoc, “KAMER became each other’s doctors” by sharing
and supporting each other, not simply ‘giving’ help which she considers to be a hierarchical system
(Akkoc, 2012:109).
Who’s Guilty? is a report of a project that aimed to evince all the violence and discrimination
a woman experiences from her infancy to her adulthood, and to identify the perpetrators of this
violence. In this project (2005), KAMER aimed to raise awareness of the target group’s experience
of gender-based violence and discrimination, to identify the invisible perpetrators in each case and
finally to identify the conditions and needs of Syrian refugees who fled from Syria after the civil war
in 2013.6 During this research, 23,000 women were interviewed face-to-face in 23 provinces of the
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions, within disadvantaged and confined neighborhoods
formed through migration (KAMER, 2005:7).

6

After the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, the AKP has adopted “open door policy” and the country currently hosting

over 3.5 million Syrian refugees are living in Turkey, according to the Ministry of Interior Directorate of General of
Migration Management, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik, accessed in
04.01.2019.
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Figure 2: The kind of supports KAMER provided in 2016 (source: Who’s Guilty?)

Overall, KAMER’s awareness workshops for women’s human rights aim to improve
women’s recognition of violence in all its forms; from physical, sexual, economic, psychological, to
verbal ones. Throughout these workshops, Akkoc states “we overcame the loneliness and the feeling
of shame caused by being subjected to violence. We gained awareness that we had to be empowered
in every aspect in order to stand up against violence…[W]hile struggling to free ourselves from
violence, we felt the need for a women’s organization where women can get support” (Akkoc,
2012:106). To satisfy this need, KAMER started operating its “Emergency Helpline” in 1997.
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1.3.2. Emergency Support Programs
“Women who become aware and decide to free themselves from the violence in their lives
can apply for this service for emergency support” (interviewee, KAMER).
Based on the needs identified, Akkoc and her friends had decided to build an “Emergency
Helpline” which serves women on a 24-hour basis since December 1997. Throughout this project,
as had been observed in the “awareness practices” groups (1996), they realized that what they were
doing “[w]as not ‘helping’ each other, but providing ‘support.’ The relation between one who is
helping and one who is helped could have jeopardized the relationship we were dreaming of
establishing between two equals. None of us were ‘saved’” (ibid: 106). As a result, the name was
changed from ‘Emergency Helpline’ to ‘Emergency Support Centers.’ In the early years of these
centers, KAMER received support from The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation and the
Ankara Foundation for Women’s Solidarity, two women’s organizations in Turkey specifically
working on violence against women at the time. KAMER also worked with psychologist Julide Aral,
Ufuk Sezgin, and Insa Wessendorf from Germany: the latter had previously worked on violence
against women in her country and during the course of the project, she started living in Diyarbakır.
With this program, KAMER aims to meet the immediate needs of women that require support
in order to prevent violence they have been exposed to and to ensure they obtain the psy-chological
and legal support they requested. In addition to this, it “supports possible victims of a possible murder
that may be committed under the name of ‘honor’. Although KAMER had started working on
violence in 1997, it wasn’t until 2003 that the organization initiated work on the murders (committed)
under the guise of ‘honor.’ “It did not even cross our minds that ‘honor’ killings should be in our
agenda to work. We hadn’t even realized how much these murders had been legitimized and
normalized, despite of working on violence all those years. When I think about our blindness, I feel
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paralyzed” (Akkoc in Belge, 2012:177).
After receiving two calls in 2002 from a woman who “had repeatedly told KAMER that she
was frightened and had been confined to her house and was certain she would be killed:” it soon after
found out she had been killed, through a local newspaper. In the same year, KAMER received another
call from a journalist who reported a similar incident, which also ended with murder. These two
events, which had taken place in a short space of time, “shocked [them] to [their] very core” and had
provoked discussions on the issue of ‘honor’ and ‘honor killings.’” In 2003, the organization finally
started reaching out to every women and girls who sought support or assistance to see if they were
at risk of murder. After listening to the stories of women in danger, the team realized that these socalled ‘honor’ killings were only the “tip of the iceberg” and “too risky” to be tackled by a single
state agency and a single NGO: “we were tackling a social problem, the solution to which could be
found only by means of a collective effort on the part of all social parties.” Thereafter, KAMER
started seeking new partnerships with governorships, district-governorships, social work agencies,
gendarmeries, the police, muftis, various NGOs, and a large number of volunteer women and men
sensitive to this issue and desire to help. From then onwards, “the projects that were designed and
carried out after 2004 were not solely projects of KAMER” (Bora, 2011: 160-163). These
partnerships, particularly with the government, are frowned upon and criticized widely by other
feminist NGOs, a topic which will be analyzed in the third chapter in more detail.
In the following year, the “Project for the Development of Permanent Methods in the Struggle
Against Killings Committed Under the Guise of ‘Honor’ in the Southeast and East Anatolia Regions”7
was initiated and funded by the British Council and supported by the Denmark-based the OAK
Foundation and the Swedish Consulate General in Istanbul. In 2011, the report We Can Stop This was

7

We Will Not Get Used To It! (2003), No More “If Only’s” (2004), Who’s to Blame? (2005), We Can Stop This (2006),

We Can Stop This ---Assembled Evaluation on Violence and Killing in the Name of Honor(2011) are the series of reports
that were prepared by Killings in the Name of Honor Project--- Project Team
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published. In this publication, the term “honor” is explained as follows: “[H]onor consists of standards
of behavior that have been produced by the universally prevalent male-dominant system of thought in
order to be able to maintain women’s secondary status and to be able to hinder equality between women
and men. These standards vary depending upon characteristics of culture and tradition” (Bora, 2011:181).
Due to this variety and the difficulty of the definition of ‘honor’, the report focuses on what honor killings
are not, with the aim of debunking common beliefs by noting that neither domestic violence against
women nor murders committed in the name of ‘honor’ are a ‘family matter’ or a problem stemming from
‘ignorance.’ The main reason for such cases is shown as women’s ‘failure’ to abide by the patriarchy and
its standards, which are imposed upon women and this disobedience may take various forms from failing
to ‘serve’ her husband or other men in the family, to refusing to marry someone her family chooses.

Contrary to what is commonly believed, KAMER emphasizes that “victims of honor killings are not
only poor and undereducated women” and that “they are not only Kurdish women.” In other words,
these women in question are not simply poor victims, living “over there,” somewhere foreign, but
that they are active agents employing all the possible means they have to preserve their lives and
integrity under the most adverse of conditions (ibid, 182).
The same team published Who’s to Blame? in 2015, addressing the same theme. During this
project, “Emergency Teams” were created in Mardin and Diyarbakir to interfere with any possible
homicides committed under the name of ‘honor.’ Nine more branches of KAMER opened in 2005
in each province of the Southern and the Eastern Anatolia Regions, while penalties increased for
enablers and abettors of such crimes; finally, sanctions were implemented within the new Turkish
Penal Code.
In these projects, KAMER aims i) to determine how people view killings committed in the
name of honor ii) to provide a basis for future projects, creating communication such as posters as a
means of enlightening the public on this matter iii) to determine preventive measures to be taken
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iv) to determine the means of struggling against killings committed in the name of honor v) to
determine the views of men who live in rural areas where honor killings are more frequently
committed vi) to assess the significance of gender identity regarding honor killings vii) to assess the
differences in rural and urban populations’ perception of honor killings viii) and finally to assess the
differences in how different ethnic groups view honor killings (ibid: 216).
1.3.3. The Women’s Entrepreneurship Program

“Working with a number of women throughout the years, KAMER came to see how powerful
each woman was despite all of the hardship, oppression, and repression experienced,
insomuch that they were capable of creating miracles out of even the tiniest bit of support.
They were not simply victims, they were also active, resilient resisters who were fully aware
of all the rules, restrictions and limitations they faced and they fought against all the barriers
to dismantle them, for [the sake of] emancipation” (Bora, 2011:163).

The Women’s Entrepreneurship Program aims to support women who become aware of and
question the traditional status of women in society, and as such try to change their life by joining
awareness workshops and / or receiving support through the emergency support programs. “Some
women who had applied to KAMER while in danger of being killed went on to become independent
women who earned their living by working or setting up their own businesses. All women, it seemed,
needed an opportunity to change their lives.” And it was necessary to become organized on a large
scale in order to create those opportunities for women” (KAMER website, Women’s
Entrepreneurship Program). Thus, the “An Opportunity for Every Woman Project” was designed in
2005. Throughout the program, activities such as “Calculation for Women Entrepreneurship,”
“Quality and Standards Control,” and “Product Development and Design” as well as subject-based
meetings are proposed (on 17 occasions) in order to strengthen women’s skills. Moreover, with this
project, women participants are trained on their economic rights.
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As a result of this project, 98% of women participants stated that they raised their awareness
on economic violence, learned about their economic rights, and the percentage of job applications
increased by 57%. Rather than taking the risk of failure which is often a deterrent to entrepreneurship,
this program is designed to strengthen skills and expand the knowledge of women who cannot afford
to build their own businesses, to teach them how to make a living. Lastly, the number of women
working at KAMER’s sewing centers and production ateliers increased 12 times, and it employed
228 women in 2017. Thanks to this entrepreneurship program “countless women had created
miracles out of limited opportunities and support” (KAMER website, Women’s Entrepreneurship).
1.3.4. The Early Childhood Education Program

The Early Childhood Education Program develops and ensures the practicability of
alternative education methods that are free from violence, that does not comprise gender
discrimination and that encourage learning through experience and participation from early
childhood through the practices conducted in the name of “Women and Children will Change the
World”. One of the teachers and designers of this project explained the program and how it started:

“Childhood education always gives positive and faster results. We initiated a project called
‘Women and Children will Change the World’ in 2000 and ran this project for 9 years
alongside other women’s awareness projects. In the beginning, not as many women as we
had expected came to our centers. Then we visited houses in all the provinces one by one.
And they, as victims of the patriarchy, did not want their daughters and other girls to
experience what they had endured. As long as women leave their ‘home’, they become
accessible” (interview, KAMER).
The program provides early childhood education and works with fathers in a project called
‘Playing Together.’ During the training, hierarchical student-teacher relationships and gender basedroles are avoided. The project, adapted from a system in the Netherlands, aims to increase the
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awareness of the mothers, families, and other institutions as well as that of society as a whole, with
regards to the importance of early childhood education and the contribution to the dissemination of
early childhood education while aiming to eliminate gender-based roles in the household.

“Women and children look alike: They are both treated as if they ‘belong’ to someone. But
we, in this project, emphasize that ‘children are individuals.’ And they all are, from
babysitters to teachers, trained in gender mainstreaming” (interview, KAMER).
Throughout this project, both families and children are trained on children rights, violence, and abuse
against children, and learn violence-free communication with children.
1.3.5. Support for Refugee Women and Children Program
KAMER designed to support programs specifically for Syrian refugee women and children
with the mission of ensuring “each person who sought asylum in Turkey could enjoy the same rights
and opportunities as others do.” In addition to these programs that were designed for the integration
of refugee women and children, separate projects are also conducted to distribute humanitarian aid
provided for Syrian refugees.
KAMER has also established 7 Migrant Health Centers for women, mainly for Syrian
immigrant women and children in 7 different provinces. During my research in Mardin, I visited the
Mardin Migrant Health Center that works as a walk-in clinic. In addition to reproductive health
training that is given by medical doctors, these clinics also deliver free services in Arabic for Syrian
women and children such as check-ups, therapy, vaccination, and birth care. All the staff - from
medical doctors to receptionists - according to Akkoc, need to join KAMER’s gender awareness
programs every week. As these Centers are established with support from and collaboration with the
AKP government, their governance will be handed over to the AKP in 2019.
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Figure 3: Working areas of women’s rights NGOs in Turkey

Independently from each project and its individual methods adopted, the most significant and
fundamental method KAMER employs is household visits and neighborhood meetings: something
it practices every day, which distinguishes KAMER from its peer women’s rights NGOs in Turkey.
“Upon observing that women living in the urban slum areas have difficulty accessing KAMER or
any other support organization, we have begun to visit these neighborhoods to establish relationships
with the women living there, on an individual basis. This method has served to considerably increase
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the demand for support against violence, especially against honor killings. We have distributed
promotional materials at a large number of meetings and during home visits.”
With these household visits, KAMER aims to raise awareness for domestic violence; to
provide information on the ways in which women protect themselves and fight against violence; to
offer support for these purposes; and to obtain information for identifying the profile of women
experiencing violence and their needs. In addition, KAMER believes this motivates female members
of households to integrate city life, in order to benefit from the social services provided in ts
respective cities, and establishing personal contacts with women who have no access to social
services (Women's Rights Human Rights Project 2017:7)
During my research in 2018, I accompanied a team of women from the organization who
mostly speak Kurdish (with Zazaja and/or Kurmanji dialects) or Arabic in addition to Turkish, and
knocked on doors, asking women if they had time to chat. Although some of them were hesitant and
reluctant to talk, the majority were open to talking despite their initial doubts, thanks to the help of
the experienced women of KAMER who could connect with them by talking about casual topics to
start a dialogue. We asked questions to local women while filling out the questionnaires as we
chatted. These questions mostly focused on their families, marriages, and children such as:

● age of first marriage
● how they became married
● education status
● average income (personal and household)
● the basis of the distributive share of inheritance
● whether they thought women subjected to violence
● comments on spending quality time with children
● the most important problems in the neighborhood
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At the end of these visits, KAMER introduced the organization, its services, and workshops
and invites them to its office. If a woman shared a problem about her life, e.g., not receiving alimony
payment, poverty, insurance, unemployment payment, the women of KAMER shared their
knowledge on the specific topic and explain how KAMER can help them in the process. As a result,
we can see below that the highest percentage of women who reached out to KAMER and sought help
had met with KAMER through home visits and the women’s marital status:

Figure 4: How Do Women Reach out to KAMER? (source: Who’s Guilty?)

Figure 5: Marriage status among single women who were visited during the house visits in 2016

Doing grassroots work is crucial for women’s rights NGOs as a means of reaching out to
women who are not mobile due to social-cultural pressures and poverty. This fieldwork serves as the
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fundamental tools required to determine the real needs of women and allow women to take the
initiative to create and form future projects for the organization. Hence, KAMER could develop its
“horizontal” capacity with a locally focused organization model, rather privileging a “top-down”
approach. Working on the ground thus successfully averts hierarchical relationships such as “the
giver/endower” and “given/endowed.” In this sense, KAMER’s methods and work has made a
significant contribution to Turkish feminist movement and organizations.
Overall, in a period where violence was prevalent and intense, and in regions— Eastern and
Southern Anatolia — where ethnicity-based politics were common and everyone was seen or forced
to take a “side,” KAMER remained an independent organization and has contributed greatly to the
growth of “independence”, “inclusiveness” and “egalitarian” methods of Turkish feminist
organizations. With its decades-long independent work, it has gathered women from various
religions and ethnicities under the umbrella of “womanhood.” However, KAMER has been
increasingly criticized by other women’s rights NGOs due to its collaboration with the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), as the tensions between the government, feminist groups and
organizations have increased. Before discussing the position of KAMER and its relationship with
the state, the current government and its gender politics will be analyzed in Chapter 2.
2. GENDER POLITICS OF THE AKP
Women, women’s bodies and their reproductive roles have always had a crucial importance
in nation-building and construction of society: women have been a central part of the creation of
social, political, and economic discourse. As “women affect and are affected” by national projects in
various dimensions, discourse on gender and nation are usually interwoven. According to Nira
Yuval-Davis, women are not only biological producers of the nation but also its cultural reproducers,
often being given the task of ‘guardians of culture’ who are responsible for transmitting it to their
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children and constructing the ‘home’ in a given cultural style” (1997:116). As a result, women and
their roles in society become apparent in the agenda of political actors and in their political discourse.
This chapter will analyze the intertwined nature of (bio)power defined by a regulatory and
disciplinary function as directed to population rather than to territory. To do so, the selected events
that reflect the gender politics of Turkey’s ruling party Justice and Development Party (AKP) will
be analyzed through the lens of Foucauldian power.
3.1. From Apprenticeship to Pre-Mastership: Bargaining with AKP (2002-2011)
The November 2002 general election was a turning point in Turkish politics and in Turkish
history. Not only did the AKP come into power, but did so with a majority of seats in the Turkish
parliament, which was then rare in Turkish politics. The AKP’s electoral success continued in the
general elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 (twice), and more recently in 2018: they declared its victory
in each election by increasing its popular vote from 34.28% in 2002 to 49.9% in 2011. “It is worth
noting that neither party or leader has since reached these levels of popularity in Turkish political
history, not even the country’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk” (Caliskan and Waldman, 2017).
Since the AKP, with Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan as its one of the founders, has come into
power, political discourse and practices as well as gender politics in Turkey have undergone
dramatic changes that have manifested themselves in the policies of the government. The AKP,
which has always defined its political identity as ‘conservative’ by its founders and members, has
continued the decades-long neoliberal socio-economic restrictions and the imposition of a
conservative and increasingly Islamist ideology that impacts political, social, and cultural domains
of daily life. Ever since the AKP has increased its electoral and executive power, it has shifted, or
as Bashirov and Lancaster put it, “troublingly reversed” (Bashirov and Lancester, 2018) its
discourse, which is directly reflected in its policy-making such as in its pro-family policies as well
as in its increasingly vocalized conservative rhetoric. However, some discuss this shift within the
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discourse and the gender politics not as a manifestation of a profound and ever-increasing
illiberalization and electoral authoritarianism, but rather as the unveiling of the “real intention” or
the “true agenda” of the party after the dissolution of the country’s military tutelary regime in 2010
(White and Herzog, 2016). Nonetheless, due to the scope and the limits of this work, I will not
discuss or attempt to read the “real intentions” of the party nor will I try to make sense of the
“democratic roll-back” that has occurred, as this has already been argued heavily among scholars
that have extensively conceptualized the state of affairs (Tas, 2015; Turkmen Dervisoglu 2005;
Ozbudun, 20015; Esen and Gumuscu, 2016; Akkoyunlu, and Oktem, 2016). Instead, this chapter
will discuss the party’s politics that have targeted women as a new territory and as the reproducers
of population.
Under the rule of the AKP, particularly during its first term (2002–2007) and at the beginning
of the second term (2007-2011) which Erdogan respectively refers to as an ‘apprenticeship’ and ‘premastership’ of the party, the party politics carried out, as Feride Acar and Gulbanu Altunok
described, a “comprehensive neoliberal agenda that prioritized economic concerns and market
rationality” (2013: 14). Nonetheless, significant legal advances have been achieved in terms of
women’s rights, in accordance with Turkey’s European Union (EU) accession negotiations for full
membership.8 More specifically, the new Turkish Criminal Law (TCK), No. 5237, entering into force
in June 2005 (amended by the law no.765), categorizes ‘sexual harassment’ as a substantive offense,
for the first time in the Turkish Penal Code. Following that, the government actively supported the
drafting process and adoption of the ‘Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)’ during 2009–2011, while

8

Following the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the EU officially recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership. In order

to meet the EU’s criteria for the full membership, the Turkish government introduced a series of reform packages, started
in 2001 before the AKP was elected, but the speed of the process was increased greatly with the AKP government.

29

maintaining the rhetoric through which it emphasized the party’s strong commitment to the European
Union (EU)’s democratic values and liberal economic principles. Along these lines, Fatma Sahin,
the former Minister of Family and Social Policies, collaborated with a number of women’s rights
NGOs and activists: these mutually consulted meetings were concluded by the ratification of the
Istanbul Convention agreement as the first member state of the Council of Europe to do so without
reservations, in 2012.9
With this agreement, which takes a thorough stance on preventing gender-based violence of
any kind, the government acknowledges that the prevalence of this problem in Turkey requires
introducing practical measures such as legislation and the allocation of resources to effectively
prevent and combat violence against women, which includes legislation on domestic violence.
Therefore, a year after the convention, the 1998 Law on “Protecting the Family” (Law No. 4320),
which had originally only provided protection to officially married women and thus received
criticism from Turkish women’s rights NGOs for falling short of the conceptual and practical
standards they had set, was superseded by a new law titled “Protecting the Family and Protecting
Women Against Violence,” (Law No. 6284) which protects all women irrespective of their official
marital status, entering into force on March 2012.
However, as discussed widely in the feminist literature, patriarchy is ingrained in and
perpetuated by the state, laws, policies, socio-economic relations and the state plays a vital role in
regulating, reproducing, governing, and disciplining gendered bodies, in particular, womanhood and
gender relationships as neither of the latter are stationary (Hooks, 1984; Arat and Gul, 2009;

9

This agreement is the prevention of violence against women, the protection of women victims of violence, the effective

prosecution and punishment of those who perpetuate violence against women, and the need for multilateral strategies to
address these issues. In this context, it is seen that the state's perspective on gender equality and the empowerment of
women is essential for effective combat with violence. For more details: “The Istanbul Convention and the CEDAW
Framework,” https://rm.coe.int/168059aa28.
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Kandiyoti,1991; Mayer, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Taking legal measures such as those previously
discussed could be per se considered a hindrance to violence, however in the case of Turkey, these
positive developments regarding women’s issues have led to the substantial increase of pro-gender
equality practices.
It is important to underline here that in spite of the AKP’s dialogue with women’s rights
NGOs, and the signature of international agreements and judicial improvements in favor of women,
that the party has been reluctant to recognize and structurally analyze of the origins of violence
against women (e.g. patriarchy), and has not initiated the transformative reformations that would
eliminate gender-based inequality through empowerment of women (not just ‘family’), for example,
by making affirmative action a constitutional provision and amending the Electoral Law and Law on
Parties to make gender quotas legally binding. (Acar et al., 2007; Altuniok & Gozdasaoglu
Kucukalioglu, 2009; Cosar et al, 2011). Ultimately, it is not possible to consider the AKP to be a
pro-women’s rights political party, which will be more salient in the next two terms of the party’s
politics described below.
3.2. From Mastership to Great Mastership: Building the “New Turkey” (2011- Present)
“Whatever we [women] gained lasted up until 2012. We legislated the 6284 Law. 338
organizations and 452 covered, uncovered, LGBTQ, leftist, right-wingers; women from
different backgrounds gathered at The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the forum that took place in 2003.”
(Interviewee, Vice Chair, NGO-1).
“We worked with members of the AKP, particularly Fatma Sahin, the former Minister of
Family and Social Policies (in the third cabinet of Erdogan; Guldal Aksit, the Minister of
Culture and Tourism from the first cabinet; Nimet Bas, the Minister of State, and the Minister
of National Education and that they did their best to contribute [to women’s
rights/empowerment].... but after the referendum in 2010, most were disappointed with the
government and politics because it had failed to uphold its made promises.”
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(Interviewee, Founder, NGO-2).
“Despite all of this, I still believe that we need to sit at the table with the AKP government.
However, they don’t even invite us anymore. They were respectful before. But now, they
dispose of those who are knowledgeable of the subject. So many people are scared: In the
2000s, when we published a notice, over 400 organizations came to sign it, but now we can’t
gather more than 160 signatures”
(Interviewee, Lawyer and Chair. NGO-3).
The three remarks above are made by the women founders of three NGOs from different
regions and political views and backgrounds, who have all worked closely with the AKP government
during the EU accession period in the early 2000s. To provide some details, the first quote belongs
to a women’s rights NGO based in Ankara, in the region of Central Anatolia, whose mission is to
fight against discrimination against religious women in modern societies. During our interview in
2018 in Ankara, the founder (my interviewee) defined her organization as ‘pious’ but noted: "not [of]
one type of religiousness’ and that its members spanned the political spectrum (AKP supporters and
its opponents), and included members who believed that women and men cannot be equal.
According to her, the organization officially supported a political party, AKP, for the first
time in 2002. The second one is an independent NGO based in Diyarbakir and actively work on
violence against women.
The third statement was quoted from a conversation with a lawyer and the founder of one of
Turkey’s oldest women’s rights NGOs, founded in the early 1900s, based in Ankara. This NGO’s
position and mission align with the ideas and principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder and
first president of the Turkish Republic, which is referred to as “Kemalist ideology,” which
symbolizes six principles that are “republicanism, statism (in economic policy), populism,
secularism, nationalism, and reformism” (Mete, 2019). The language of the organization’s website
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often makes references to nationalism when discussing “Turkish(ness of) women” and the Turkish
Republic, and outline its main goal as the social, economic, and political equality between women
and men in Turkey.
These three quotes from different women’s rights NGOs illustrate the relatively abrupt
maneuver in the gender politics of the AKP that have been visible primarily from the second term of
the party in the early 2010s onwards, highlighting the party’s contradictory claims. As some argued,
this repositioning of the AKP on women’s issues has worked as a “litmus test for its liberal image”
and reads as a basic reflection of the complex and contradictory nature of neoliberal settings (Cosar,
2011:564 and Duggan, 2003:70).
The AKP’s stance has gradually evolved from a willingness to open dialogue and collaborate
with feminists and women’s rights NGOs to an increasing lack of interest and at times outright
hostility towards feminist demands. This change can be traced both in the party’s policies, discourse,
and statements which will be mentioned in this section. First, the party’s initial emphasis on
cooperation with women’s rights organizations and its legal responses to concerns of gender
sensitivity were replaced with pro-family policies that are closely aligned with conservative rhetoric:
the party made an attempt to restrict access to abortion for women from ten weeks to four with a
proposed bill in 2012, which suffered a backlash and could not pass into law, and can be seen as an
example of the AKP’s ideal of ‘strengthening the family;’ likewise, the ‘Ministry for Women and
Family’ was renamed ‘Ministry of Family and Social Policies’, in line with a statement by the thenPrime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that “we are a democratic–conservative party:
family is important to us.” In 2016, Erdogan portrayed “a woman who rejects motherhood, who
refrains from being around the house, however successful her working life is” as “deficient,” and
“incomplete” and recommended “having at least three children" because “strong families lead to
strong nations.”
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In November 2016, Turkey’s ruling party proposed a bill to Parliament in which child rapists
would be freed from jail on the condition that they marry their victims, a scheme that would allow
girls under the age of 16 to be ‘reunified’ as a family unit with the men who had abused them.
According to the AKP, the bill was intended to benefit men who had sex with a minor with whom
they are in a relationship, as well as to downplay the complications of child marriage within the
country. The proposed bill sparked outrage in the country, led to thousands of people taking to the
streets and was condemned abroad. After two weeks of well-attended street protests, and criticism
from a broad coalition comprised of civil society groups, women’s rights and LGBTQ organizations,
pro-secular and leftist groups/organizations and opposition politicians, the proposed bill was
withdrawn.
The AKP’s policies, regulations, practices, and statements that followed this proposed bill
are a brief yet illustrative example of Foucauldian regulatory (bio)power over the country’s
population that desires to create ‘docile bodies’ to practice a series of appropriate technologies that
serves its conscious aim of building a stronger nation. Michel Foucault explains power as something
that “penetrates every inch of body and relationships,” that interferes and makes decisions on behalf
of individuals about their life and their relationships by using its own strategic logic and tactics and
normalizes these relationships (Foucault, 1978). Using this framework, we better understand AKP’s
use of power in its prescription of three-children families, normalization of abuse and underage
marriage and definition of the extents of what is lawful and what is not: defining who should marry
whom, under which conditions, at what age, and who can be considered a mother, by using various
means such as official statements and legal amendment. This discourse functions to rebuild, to
perpetuate, to leverage the norms e.g., women as the “guardians of culture” or “bearers of the
collective.” In this way, power defines and determines all kinds of relationships, and draws the lines
in between and amongst relationships. After the normativity of things is framed and that what can be
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accounted as normal is asserted, power becomes eligible to change them physically and
constitutionally.
As shown, the AKP and its gender politics are used as the regulative power that is
‘supplanted by’ sovereign power, and they intervene very intimately in the lives and decisions of
women by deploying numerous and diverse techniques as a means of “achieving the subjugation of
bodies and control of populations” (Foucault, 1972: 94). However, in spite of its approach to
disciplining society by imposing precise and detailed norms, (i.e. to achieve normalization of
conservative ideological morals), AKP politics are careful to remain within the realm of democracy
as a means of maintaining its legitimacy, which diverges from traditional technologies of power that
are directed to territory rather than to population, as was described earlier. In other words, the AKP
criticizes feminists and feminist values by opposing them to the values of Turkish society:

“[F]eminism leads to grave consequences in moral and social respects. Above all, the woman
who falls into the feminist movement, [by acting] through the principle of unconditional
freedom ignores many of the rules and values which are indispensable for the family” (AKP
statement quoted in Gursozlu-Suslu, 2008)”
Furthermore, in addition to using technologies of discursive governance which inculcates
ideas to the collective rationality of the public, (e.g. as discussed in the relationship between AKP
and feminism above), the AKP has invented new apparatuses and technologies to foster the state’s
agenda, to undergird and leverage its own legitimacy and to disseminate its axis of conservative
identity, instead of using traditional, interventionist sovereign power’s techniques of punishment:
“gibbets, gallows, pillories, red-hot pincers, boiling oils” (Foucault, 1995). The establishment of the
Woman and Democracy Association (KADEM), has specifically filled “this role for effective,
discursive governance, [as the] the political authority deploys influential narratives, leitmotifs, and
metaphors” (Diner, 2018).
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KADEM was co-founded by the Prime Minister Erdogan’s oldest daughter, Sumeyye
Erdogan in 2013 as a women’s “civil society organization”, in name only: it is not independent from
the government and “do not contribute to the expansion of the civil sphere and democratization and
thus it falls into the category of Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations
(GONGOs) that are mostly established by women from within the state apparatus or strictly
controlled by the state” and for that it is perceived as a ‘government project’ by feminists (ibid,
2018:103; Doyle, 2017).

These GONGOs, in contrast to nongovernmental organizations, work closely with the
government in their projects and are funded by various ministries. While the Turkish independent
women’s rights NGOs have been subjected to bureaucratic ordeals such as heavy auditing and
exclusion from representation (alongside the state) on international platforms such as the UN Women
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), KADEM has been present on platforms such as the
Consultative Status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and has been
UN-accredited as an non-governmental organization, which is the highest status granted by the
United Nations and allows NGOs to participate in UN projects. (Doyle, 2017;Yilmaz, 2015; Oz,
2015).
The mission of KADEM is defined as “cultivating a consciousness of traditional values and
its practice in real life among the Turkish women,”10 which emphasizes “gender justice rather than
the equality between men and women,” and supports the Prime Minister Erdogan’s views regarding
gender equality as he once claimed “women and men cannot be equal; this is against nature.”
(Yilmaz, 2015) The women of KADEM position themselves as opposed to “a classical egalitarian
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KADEM website, “Our Mission” http://kademvakfi.org.tr/kurumsal/misyonumuz/ accessed in 15.04.2019
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feminism that had detrimental effects on women’s rights in Turkey” because it has “created a
homogenous image of women, thus ignored the differences among them, for instance: conservative
women.” However, it is important to address that this stance should not be seen as encouraging
more polarity in feminism that would “spark a dialectic creativity/relationship” as Audre Lorde once
said, because these women still “define the master’s house as their only source of support.” (1984:2)
On November 3, 2017, the Law No. 5490 on the Civil Registration Services, authorized
muftis11 from the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in addition to the officers of branches of
the Family Affairs Directorate to perform civil marriages. Despite the criticism and protests by
feminist organizations and civil society activists, and strong opposition by lawmakers, this
controversial bill passed in parliament and President Erdogan turned a deaf ear to the criticism by
stating: “this bill will be passed whether you like it or not.”12 While underage marriage through
unofficial religious unions is illegal, it is widespread in Turkey. According to a survey13 conducted
by the Turkish Statistical Institute, nearly one in five people in Turkey (17.9 percent) will get married

11

During the discussions “imam” and “muftis” have been used interchangeably. However, it is important to note that,

according to the Directions of Duties and Job Responsibilities of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, muftis (muftin
“one delivers formal opinion”, “a Muslim scholar” in Arabic) and imams ( “leader” in Arabic) are both expected to have
in-depth knowledge of the Qur’an as well as thorough knowledge of worship methodology. Yet, while imams are not
required to have Bachelor’s degree in theology to be assigned, religious vocational (“imam-hatip”) high school degree
would be sufficient; muftis are required to have theology degree minimum at BA level in Turkey. The duties of imams
are defined mostly as leading the congregational prayers, informing cemaat at mosques about religious topics with the
permission of muftis, and being responsible for the maintenance of mosques they are assigned to. Muftis, on the other
hand, have greater authorities such as preaching, organizing conferences, representing the Directorate of Religious
Affairs and appointing personals in its provinces.
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President Erdogan’s speech on October 13, 2017,during the parliamentary discussions:

http://bianet.org/english/politics/190586-erdogan-muftis-to-perform-marriage-whether-you-like-it-or-not, accessed in
04.19.2019.
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http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21869 accessed in 01.25.2019
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before reaching the age of 18. When it comes to women, this number goes up to nearly 30 percent.14
Around the time of discussions on Law No. 5490, hundreds of women’s and LGBTQ organizations
collaborated and published a notice that called “For Equality and Free Life, These Bills can’t Pass
Like This”15 in September 2017.
In the notice, they discussed the controversies over the promotion of the unity of family, the
problematization of the increasing number of divorces in the country and the normalization of
inequality between women and men by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and raised alarms about
the directorate’s increasing voice in the country’s direction. This was underlined by the emergence
of religious references to the establishment of family and civil marriage agreements, the rise of forced
and underage marriages,16 polygyny, and increasing numbers of men refusing to share property with
their spouses. According to the feminist Hulya Osmanoglu, since 97.1% of all solemnization
marriage was both civil and religious, 1.8% was only civil and 1% was only religious,17 the bill may
also cause polarization between people who prefer secular weddings over religious ones.
In response to this, KADEM published a notice with the title “We Back Up ‘the Civil Registry
Services Act.’” The notice that supported by 97 conservative NGOs, who claimed criticism of the
bill were “baseless” and “undue” and “serve to build scary scenarios to cast a shadow over the real
reasons behind the regulation.”18 According to KADEM, the bill emerged “as a response to a social
need” and was “necessary for the principles of a secular and constitutional state” and as such will
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http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/28-percent-of-women-who-married-in-2016-in-turkey-were-underage-study-

108741.
15

The notice: https://kazete.com.tr/haber/kadinlardan-tum-yurtta-bu-yasalar-boyle-gecmez-eylemi-54274
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In the Turkish civil code, adapted from Sweden, the age of a child is set as 18 (full) for both male and female. In other

words, “a person becomes sui juris by marriage after they turn the age of 18.” However, according to the article 11/II,
under exceptional circumstances, a judge can make an exemption to allow children to marry at 17 with parental
permission.
17

Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) Report, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21869
We Back Up ‘the Civil Registry Services Act:’” http://kadem.org.tr/kadin---stklardan---kamuoyu---duyurusu--kadinlar---icin---nufus---hizmetleri---kanununa---sahip--- cikiyoruz
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encourage official marriages and make it “easier and more accessible for everyone.”
As shown, throughout the party’s terms — in its transition from “Apprenticeship” to “Great
Mastership,” the AKP did not only create its own technologies, tactics, and mechanisms but also
mastered them, in order to foster its own agenda and ideology without jeopardizing its own
legitimacy and image. By deploying complex networks and microscopic technologies within which
disciplinary and regulative functions are dovetailed while expanding horizontally rather than
vertically, the AKP’s unstable, relational, productive, and transformative power (re)constructs social
organization and organisms. As a result, the AKP’s own “truth” becomes the new de facto “truth” in
the relationship between individuals and social institutions and overall in the society. However,
despite all the pressure created, it is important to recognize the resistance and power of the feminist
groups and organizations that are ‘pushed away’ and marginalized in “the New Turkey,” as the AKP
representatives call it; one interviewee from a feminist group in Istanbul states: “The more they try
to marginalize us, the more support we receive. Each time there was a stronger backlash.”
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Figure 6: Historical Events (Turkey and International) and KAMER
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3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KAMER AND THE STATE
As shown in the previous chapter, since the AKP took office, the conservatively rooted personnel
cadres of the ministries have replaced more secular ones, and the approach to women’s rights shifted
towards redefining women’s function as cultivators of a “pious generation” as the party’s leader
Erdogan declared in 2012 (Arat 2016: 125). Throughout its seventeen years in power, the AKP
government has gradually taken the sole control of the state apparatus and consolidated its power.
The party has become more experienced and skillful in deploying the appropriate technologies and
tactics in accordance with its gender politics that serve to strengthen its conservative worldview. It
did not only change laws to accredit muftis to conduct civil marriages, giving more power to the
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), but it also changed the compulsory education system to
a ‘4+4+4’ education system,19 appointed pro-family individuals into the state organs dedicated to
working on women’s issues, and created its own counter-movements through the formation of civil
society organizations such as the Directorate General of the Status of Women (KSSGM) or the
Turkish Family Platform (TURAP) - the first coalition dedicated to promote “strong and natural
family ideals where healthy individuals can grow up,” consisting of over 100 members of NGOs,
formed the Youth and Education Service Foundation (TURGEV), and finally endorsed women’s
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Bill on Amending the Primary Education Law and Other Laws” was submitted to the Grand National Assembly of

Turkey on February 21, 2012. This system divides the eight-year primary education into two stages, stage one and stage
two, each lasting four years; and allows for distance education and apprenticeship training starting from stage two, i.e.
at the age of 10, therefore reducing compulsory education effectively to four years and enabling vocational training to
start at the age of 10. The main purpose of the bill was to disqualify primary education from being an uninterrupted basic
education program and to establish schools where different programs could be implemented after the 5th grade. The bill
also made it possible to establish secondary schools attached to high schools, therefore students, after finishing the 5th
grade, could continue their education in schools that are affiliated with vocational high schools, or imam-hatip schools
(vocational schools to train Islamic clergy). Distance learning and apprenticeship training were also included in these
different programs in the first draft of the bill. The bill caused an uproar among the non-governmental organizations that
have been working for many years on issues related to the schooling of girls and the prevention of child labor (quoted
from Sasmaz, 2012: 43).
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rights organizations such as KADEM. Meanwhile, independent and feminist women’s rights nongovernmental organizations have been marginalized and excluded from any kind of dialogue in the
decision-making processes and from collaboration with the government, on the topic of women’s
issues. In the 2010 CEDAW Shadow Report a coalition of feminist groups stated:

“Dialogue between the State Ministry of Women’s and Family Affairs, the national machinery
(General Directorate on the Status of Women-KSSGM) and women’s NGOs remains limited and
constrained…. The increasing conservatism in Turkey during the reporting period poses a
threat to women’s ability to enjoy their rights and freedoms. The already acquired legal rights of
women are subject to backlash and efforts that aim to eradicate existing discrimination are usually
met with resistance. Even positive actions by the government have conservative undertones and
include loopholes that may infringe on existing rights and freedoms” (quoted from NegrónGonzales: 2012).
This statement was repeated in the follow-up Shadow Report of 2012, with the emphasis on the
exclusion of women’s rights NGOs from the policy-making process. Melinda Negrón-Gonzales
argues that some activists vocalized the state’s intention as “attempting to sideline established
women’s organizations in favor of new organizations that were more sympathetic to the government”
(2016:207) as is echoed in my interview with a co-founder of an Ankara-based women’s rights NGO:
“Now, the government is establishing its own organizations such as KADEM. It [KADEM]
submitted a so-called Shadow Report that was worse; it was more deceptive and unrealistic
than the government's actual state report. Civil Society organizations are getting more and
more bureaucratized in Turkey” (interviewee, Ankara, 2018).
As a result of these developments that occurred during the AKP’s rule, many women’s rights NGOs
have reacted and re-positioned themselves in various ways. Many of them ‘broke the ties’ with the
AKP government and its related institutions, and ‘turned their back’ to any kind of ‘co-existence’
with these institutions as the presence of the AKP was perceived as conflicting with their raison
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d'être; while others maintained their relationships with the party to various degrees; finally, some
fused into the power and caused their own fission or fragmentation into inexistence. Therefore, the
variety between these different relationships to the party has influenced NGOs positionality towards
the state and also among other women’s rights NGOs. Some were subsequently criticized and
marginalized for their decisions to honor certain relationships, and women’s rights NGOs have
overall polarized. This variety of positions and the increased polarization within and between NGOs
can be seen as a reflection of the complexity of the state’s apparatus (dispositif) as “a thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1995). In this chapter we shall take a closer look at the
disagreements and criticisms that followed, particularly towards KAMER, as it has been accused by
other NGOs of “selling out” - highlighting the multi-faceted nature of NGOs’ reactions to the state
even within the same angle and distance of positionality.
NGOs’ relationships with the government have been discussed extensively by scholars. Their
interactions, involvement, and engagement with the government have been examined in a wide range
of categories, classifying their roles to be subservient, compensatory, corrective, collaborative, or
subversive (Clark, 1991; Fisher, 1998, Berger and Neuhaus, 1997; Beigbeber, 1991). However, the
aim of this chapter is not to categorize NGOs based on their roles in their relationship with the
government. This is because such categories remain conjectural, sometimes oversimplified, and thus
inadequate due to the presumptions of ever-changing dynamics and assumptions on the temporality
of relationships as being stationary and consistent. In addition, such approaches neglect and thus fail
to take into consideration the uniqueness of socio-political conjunctures, not only between countries
but also between regions.
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Furthermore, these approaches assume these relationships as harmonious, homogenous,
consistent, and mutually exclusive; whereas these NGOs and their relationships may simultaneously
accommodate contradictory roles e.g., both “compensatory” and “subversive.” Hence, understanding
the NGOs’ relations with the state and their positionality requires a close engagement and
involvement with the organizations, people in the organization, and their field of activities. Here, I
will revisit my fieldwork and interviews with KAMER to discuss the criticisms regarding its
relationship with the AKP government, and discuss its critiques.
During my research in Turkey, I had a chance to meet with over ten different women’s rights
NGOs in different regions. I started my interviews in the West part of the country, more specifically
in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya, where I was then located. However, I had spent more time with
KAMER as I traveled to visit its different branches across Turkey, in Diyarbakir and Mardin, in the
southeastern part of Anatolia. As discussed in the first chapter, in the course of my residence in
Diyarbakir for a week, I met with the founder and a number of KAMER staff who have worked on
different projects for many years, at the main office which was located there. I visited the Avlu Cafe
that belongs to the organization and is exclusively run by women, as well as KAMER’s pension
which typically serves women in need of accommodation, and I also visited little sewing center
located on the top floor of the organization’s building, whose products that are even sold to New
York fashion shows, and provide a source of income for the women who make them. I accompanied
a couple of women from the organization during their ‘home visits’ that took place in various districts
of Diyarbakir, where we asked local women to fill out questionnaires as they chatted. And finally, I
visited the Mardin branch of KAMER and met with the resident medical doctor at the Mardin
Migrant Health Center that provides training on reproductive health as mentioned in the first Chapter.
That is to say, I had spent more time with KAMER than any other organizations in Istanbul, Ankara,
and Antalya.
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At the early stage of my research, that involved interviews that took place in Istanbul and
Ankara, I asked my interviewees’ opinion on Turkish feminist NGOs, their relationship and
collaboration with each other, and with the government. Despite the AKP’s pressure on feminists
and despite their conservative politics, the interviewees emphasized the collaboration among the
feminist NGOs still persists, however weakened:
“[W]e feminist NGOs are not out of touch; we usually know what kind of projects we run
from the West to the East part of the country, Van to Ankara. [For example], we collaborated
with other NGOs on a project on underage marriages.”
(Founder and chair of a women’s rights NGO in Ankara)
And,
“[I]n the 2000s, when we published a notice, over 400 nongovernmental organizations came
to sign it, but now we can’t gather more than 160 signatures.”
(Lawyer and Chair of a women’s rights NGO in Ankara)

In addition to these collaborations, Nebahat Akkoc from KAMER mentioned there are some
disagreements among Turkish feminist NGOs:
“[W]e received a lot of support from the Purple Roof at the time [in the 1990s]. However, I
felt closer with the Women’s Solidarity Foundation for some reasons...The Purple Roof was
good at thinking and seeing through the universal lens/perspective, but its effort on adopting
and developing language and methodology for the local was inadequate or it was, for us. This
is the result of working and living in Istanbul...Istanbul is a completely different world. When
we, our thoughts are changing, it is easy to sink into the illusion of changing the world in this
magical world [Istanbul]. I am sure the Purple Roof and its language helped to widen our
perspectives [in the early years of KAMER]. However, in the end, thinking and working in
accordance with the global may sometimes cause to marginalization” (Akkoc quoted from
Belge, 2012:156).
During my meeting with Akkoc she also mentioned, as a point of criticism, that KAMER
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prefers to use the terms “killing under the name of honor” instead of “femicide,” which has been a
reason for conflict between KAMER and other NGOs. Akkoc thinks that the word “femicide doesn’t
reveal the real instigators of those homicides” (according to her, the roots of the problem), which are
not limited to the murderers themselves but also includes the non-deterrent judicial system in the
country that remains inefficient in preventing such crimes, and the culture which allows, encourages
and even pressures murderers to attempt crimes, rather than focusing on the ‘results’ of the problem.
Therefore, “killing under the name of honor” not only evinces the intentions behind these murders –
–“saving one’s honor” –– but also allows to unpack the question of honor and/or deconstructing the
notion of honor itself.
Apart from disagreements on language and methodology, I came across many criticisms on
the relationship between KAMER and the AKP government during my interviews. Many women,
some of whom are founders or chairs of NGOs, interpreted KAMER’s collaboration with the
government as “sleeping with the enemy.” Inevitably, the question of relationships with governments
has always been at the core of discussions in the world of NGOs. Because they are not organizations,
per se; they distinguish themselves from “organizations” by the demonstration of what they and their
(dis)positions are that is “non-governmental.” By virtue of the conditionality of their existence that
requires excluding the involvement of governments and of any governmental activities, these
organizations’ relationship with the government and the organized individuals who compose them
have always been measured. However, it is important to ask: does this definition, which underscores
what is “not” (governmental) also accommodate “anti” (governmental)?
The relationship between the AKP government and KAMER has been measured, weighed,
and frequently criticized. However, considering the region within which it operates and the nature of
the work KAMER does, as well as its self-funding (via the sewing center, Avlu Cafe, and Hostel), it
positions itself uniquely in its relationship with funders. In addition, the unique composition of its
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membership makes it stand out.
To start, the Eastern and the Southern Anatolian Regions, where KAMER works actively,
have different, more intricate socio-political characteristics than other parts of the country. This
region is more diverse, populated by different groups and ethnicities such as Armenians, Syrians,
and the majority is constituted of a Kurdish population —the biggest ethnic minority in Turkey—
which have been in conflict with the state for decades: this conflict also lead the region to be heavily
politicized. Therefore, the demography of the population KAMER works with is more diverse than
in other regions, and the women of KAMER are mostly bilingual and familiar with the culture of the
region and the women it works with. In addition, “in this region, [exacerbated] violence is
experienced in such form and frequency that violates women's bodies and their right to ive,” e.g.,
honor killings (Akkoc, 2012).
“The relationship with the government has always been such a complicated and difficult
subject for feminists. If a feminist organization or a movement collaborates with the state,
would it lose its independence? Such questions are discussed widely by feminists all around
the world. However, these questions have a different weight in Diyarbakir. Can we work on
specific subjects with a government that has oppressed the Kurdish people? If so, how, and
on which subjects? These questions are tough [to answer] for us. We have been discussing
such questions particularly in the early years of KAMER and this has caused many conflicts
with other women’s [rights] organizations” (Akkoc in Belge, 2012:164).
Moreover, as shown in the first chapter, the domain of work KAMER does is more comprehensive
by its nature than that of other NGOs: from empowerment and awareness, pre-school education to
issues of violence against women, underage marriages, and honor killing (see. Figure 2). As it mainly
focuses on violence against women, underage, forced marriages and ‘honor’ killings, the complex
nature of these subjects creates the need for equally complex resolutions. Due to the sensitivity and
urgency of the cases it addresses, KAMER does not only collaborate with the government, i.e., ‘soft
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power’, but predominantly with the ‘Repressive State Apparatus’ in Althusserian terms, which
consists of the army, the police, the judiciary, and the prison system that operates primarily by means
of mental and physical coercion and — latent and actual —violence (Buchanan, 2010). Akkoc
explains the reason for this collaboration:

“Since KAMER was founded, our primary work was to interfere with and prevent the
problem of violence against women as fastest and effectively as possible. This cannot be
achieved alone, by ourselves. [In some cases] we need protection from the police, finding
safe spaces for women to accommodate. All these require coordination with all kind of
institutions of the state. Neither KAMER or other organizations see themselves as a solution
center alone. They should not anyway. The mission of KAMER is to reveal the problems,
develop methods and official policies in favor of women, and to improve effective
methodologies through discussion. To be able to accomplish these goals, it’s so important to
provide all kinds of support. And we need to gain the trust [of women] to get this support.
Particularly, in the cases of ‘honor’ killings, doing something without having support from
police, regional governorship, and social services is extremely risky and difficult. We, as a
women’s organization, can’t deal alone with the type of violence that intends to murder
someone. Otherwise, if we didn’t have the support of social services, a woman who is
subjected to violence would have been back to the place where [she started, and] the violence
would be repeated. Also, it is a crucial step for official institutions to stand with women who
are subjected to violence, to prevent the normalization of violence. Both as a means of
changing the culture of these institutions and also not dooming these women to be left alone”
(Akkoc in Belge, 2012:167).
As Akkoc explains here, the urgency and the risk of the cases requires collaboration with the
police, gendarmerie, municipalities, the Provincial Directorates of Family and Social Policies,
Security Directorates, Bar Associations, Civil Registry Offices, Health Directories, and political
parties. Cases such as incest, early and forced marriages, ‘honor’ related violence and murders, which
constitute the great majority of KAMER’s work, are particularly challenging because they are seen
as a taboo and are commonly hidden from public sight as they remain within the private sphere and
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amongst family members. Hence, interfering in such cases while protecting women is only possible
with the state’s support, and that of its related agencies and institutions, which is determined based
on the request of women who apply to the center. On March 8th, 2000, KAMER collaborated with
the Religious Affairs Administration to deliver the khutbah, the primary formal occasion for public
preaching in the Islamic tradition, where they focused on the importance of sending girls to school
and preached against ‘honor’ killings, in mosques in Diyarbakir. According to Akkoc, these khutbahs
—in spite of many criticisms— saved so many women’s lives and as such this is a good justification
of KAMER’s stance to allow the organization to collaborate with institutions, ‘thinking globally
while acting locally’.
“In the cases of underage and forced marriages, if the woman wishes, the government
supports us, gendarme and police may intervene during incidents to prevent marriage - in
some cases they even send helicopters and saved women” (interviewee in KAMER).
Similar to the example of the deliverance of khutbas to prevent ‘honor killings’, with the
year-long project called “That’s Our Village Over There,”20 1,742 imams, gendarmerie, local
administrators, teachers, public actors, the ministers of national education, and mayors in Bitlis and
Diyarbakir were informed about women’s rights and trained on the forced and underage marriage
problem and its impacts from a variety of perspectives (i.e. health, religion, legislation). Following
this training, as an interviewee in KAMER stated, “[d]enunciations of underage and forced marriage
in the region increased and [this has helped] the police and gendarme investigated such cases”
(interviewee, KAMER).
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The project was conducted between 2014 and 2015. Its main goals are set as i) contributing to sending girls to school

ii) raising public awareness and sensibility about underage and forced marriages of girls and iii) preventing violence
against women and murders under the name of ‘honor.’ The project “aims to identify the cultural and traditional practices
that harm women and children. By doing so, [it] believe that [it] will be able to contribute to develop alternative practices
and make sure of the feasibility of their implementation. For more detail: http://www.sabancivakfi.org/en/socialchange/women-center-foundation-that-s-our-village-over-there (accessed on 18.3. 2019).
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In the Multiply through Raising Awareness: KAMER’s Method for Standing up against Violence,
Akkoc highlights that its support from or collaboration with institutions is only done in the interest
of women. The report gives the example of a married 25-year-old woman who was abused by a
family member. Because she had not indulged in his advances, the man spread gossip about her and
put her in a very difficult social situation. As a result of this gossip, the “family council” — a tradition
that is commonly seen in the region— consisting of the abuser’s family members, “[declared] [...]
her death.” She ran away, by walking 5 km to another village during a snowing winter night and hid
in her aunt’s house. Later, she sought help from KAMER. Thanks to the collaboration with the
governorship of Diyarbakir, the police and the gendarmerie, they were able to solve “one of the most
complicated and difficult cases,” and she survived. According to Akkoc, the institutions and people
providing support are “basically doing their job” and within these collaborations, KAMER’s
position and fundamental principles are maintained to be i) independent, ii) not subject to
hierarchy, iii) not discriminated against, iv) anti-violence, and v) sharing and solidarity (Akkoc,
2012:166). These principles guide them as it works with these institutions:
“We never been ‘a stooge’ of any party and always avoid working with activists who simply
position themselves as being the opponent of the ruling party. Instead of doing ‘yes-no
politics’ —by which Akkoc implies the constitutional referendum in 2010— we should
emphasize the importance of democracy, what democracy is, what a democratic society looks
like, and what it should aspire to be. Hostility with the government is unnecessary, the actual
need is communication. With this perspective, I have met with a number of ministers and the
president for possible solutions just ‘for the sake of women’" (Akkoc, 2018).
The nature of the work KAMER does also explain the criticisms it receives regarding “the
hierarchical structure of the organization that has been cemented by Akkoc's 20-year-long
presidentship,” as an interviewee in Istanbul stated. KAMER avoids any structural hierarchy such
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as head, director, and manager. At the beginning, “everyone at KAMER did all kinds of work from
cleaning to leading awareness-raising workshops, but later,” Akkoc says, “after long discussions and
dialogue, we realized and came to a mutual agreement that “the experiences and knowledge should
not be trivialized or undervalued while avoiding and resisting the hierarchy [in the organization]”
(Belge, 2012:174). In regards to the decision-making process in KAMER, the members prioritize
consensus on the principles and the methods, but unlike other organizations, they do not necessarily
follow a collective decision-making process overall. Akkoc explains the reason:

“[T]he structures of many [feminist] organizations are tied closely with collectivity and
follow collective decision-making processes. Of course, this collectivity is good, but the
region we work in and each case requires urgent intervention and solutions, and in such
situations we need to be quick in making decisions, specifically in cases of murders in the
name of ‘honor.’ Therefore, we work with the agreed principles and methods and leave the
daily decisions that do not need consensus up to individuals. This way, we have both the
balance of responsibility and authority that the collectivity has allowed, and we can act fast
in necessary cases. In the end, sluggishness in our work would be too risky” (Akkoc in Belge,
2012:157).
4. CONCLUSION
This thesis stemmed from a curiosity regarding the ways in which contemporary Turkish
feminist groups operate in a territory dominated by conservative gender politics of the AKP.
Furthermore, I was interested in the relationship between women’s rights NGOs in Turkey and their
sponsors, which are mainly the EU and the UN. I sought to delve deeper into the impact and the role
of these relationships on women’s rights NGOs. Seeing that there was a considerable volume of
literature which discussed the functions of such institutions, I initially embarked on my fieldwork in
the summer of 2018 to listen to the firsthand accounts of the experiences and thoughts of feminist
NGOs. Throughout my interviews, I particularly encountered criticism towards KAMER and its
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collaborative relationship with the state. After my visit to KAMER in 2018, the focus of my study
shifted as I became more interested in the ‘synchronized but also contradictory’ (rather than mutually
exclusive) relationship of women’s rights NGOs with the government.
This study, therefore, aimed to reveal the complicated nature of the feminist stance(s) in
women's rights NGOs that is illustrated in the case of KAMER. As definitions of the feminist
position(ality) of nongovernmental organizations are made and measured by their proximity to or
distance from institutions or groups who may espouse views and policies that could be considered
non-feminist— in this case, from a political party that has dominated state power for almost two
decades—criticisms of women's rights NGOs are frequently entrenched in those terms. Similarly,
the theoretical categories of NGOs are based upon exclusivist, sometimes binary references, such as
subservient or collaborative, as discussed throughout this work. However, women’s rights NGOs
and their feminist positions cannot be reduced to anemic characterizations: homogeneous, sanitized,
stationary, or reduced to being consistent either on regional, national or international scales. Such
designations obscure the complicated realities through which NGOs and the various actors that
circulate within them have to operate and negotiate. Power is complex and diffuse, and as such,
attention must be cast to the particularities of why and how certain women's rights NGOs choose
some strategies and partnerships over others and what the implications of those choices are.
Therefore, as the case of KAMER elucidates, understanding an NGO's feminist positionality and its
relationship to the state has to be conceptualized as dynamic, polarized, sometimes even contrasting
and, conflicting.
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